Situating Conventions of Health: Transformations, Inaccuracies, and the Limits of Measuring in the Field of Self-Tracking by Noji, Eryk et al.
www.ssoar.info
Situating Conventions of Health: Transformations,
Inaccuracies, and the Limits of Measuring in the
Field of Self-Tracking
Noji, Eryk; Kappler, Karolin; Vormbusch, Uwe
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Noji, E., Kappler, K., & Vormbusch, U. (2021). Situating Conventions of Health: Transformations, Inaccuracies, and the
Limits of Measuring in the Field of Self-Tracking. Historical Social Research, 46(1), 261-284. https://doi.org/10.12759/
hsr.46.2021.1.261-284
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
 
Historical Social Research 46 (2021) 1, 261-284 │ published by GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.46.2021.1.261-284 
Situating Conventions of Health: Transformations, 
Inaccuracies, and the Limits of Measuring in 
the Field of Self-Tracking 
Eryk Noji, Karolin Kappler & Uwe Vormbusch  
Abstract: »Situierung von Gesundheitskonventionen: Transformationen, Unge-
nauigkeiten und die Grenzen des Messens auf dem Gebiet des Self-Trackings«. 
How is doing health transformed into a measurable entity? Based on empiri-
cal research,1 we will analyze relevant aspects of quantifying health in two 
distinct fields: diet and mood-tracking. From the perspective of the econom-
ics of convention, self-trackers within these fields are investing in new forms 
and measures of equivalence for how health can be measured and handled. 
In doing so, they are confronting three main obstacles: the inaccuracy of 
measuring, the cumbersome materiality of objects and everyday practice, 
and the fuzzy relation of everyday doings and measuring. On the one hand, 
self-trackers are striving for practical consent over what an “accurate” meas-
uring looks like and in what cases inaccuracy can respectively not be toler-
ated. On the other hand, self-trackers draw on varying criteria for adequate 
accuracy depending on how they practically integrate their tracking practices 
into everyday life. In the economics of convention, objects are granted a vital 
role, supporting competent everyday actors in their coordination efforts as 
well as tackling normative and ethical issues. We suggest that technologies 
such as sensors, mHealth applications, and smartphones are involved in eve-
ryday practices as intermediate objects in varying engagements and negoti-
ation processes. In both fields of self-tracking, quite a unique configuration 
of measuring, objects, resistiveness, and engagements (Thévenot 2002, 2014) 
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emerges, making present conventions of health evasive and fragmented, and 
still quite unavailable to health organizations, policy makers, and users alike.  
Keywords: Self-tracking, self-quantification, valuation studies, economics of 
convention, investment in form, materialities. 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, we observe a fulminant advance of quantification, possibly 
most obviously with the invention of still heterogeneous taxonomies and cal-
culative practices framing the human body, the subject, and his or her every-
day routines. Although there have been relevant quantification and tracking 
efforts in the past (Zillien et al. 2016; Fröhlich 2019), the digitalization of (self-
)tracking has expanded its depth and scope dramatically, fueling discussions 
about the utility, appropriateness, and ethics of the associated numbers and 
taxonomies (Vormbusch 2020).  
Even if the history of modernity is also the history of increasing instrumen-
tal knowledge about the human body and its “health status” – Michel Fou-
cault’s work is certainly the best-known reference in this context – this 
knowledge never came close to the living body and subjectively experienced 
notions of well-being or health. That is because this knowledge in an ideal 
sense remained a formal body of knowledge (so to speak) linked to the indi-
vidual only by logical assumptions, formal rules, and scientific procedures, 
much like what Desrosières and Thévenot (1979) call “logical classifications.” 
They point out that such logical classifications and categories will not become 
valid descriptions of what is going on until they are rooted in everyday classi-
fication practices ordinary actors are engaged in. Diaz-Bone (2016, 52) puts it 
like this: “No social classification can be built only on logical principles alone 
and no social classification can be built on empirical data alone.” One could 
argue that for generations modern medicine has done its best to rebut such a 
notion and that the emerging self-quantification of health is one approach to 
regain individual autonomy by articulating quantified knowledge, embodied 
experiences, and everyday practice. To achieve this, new conventions for 
measuring health must necessarily evolve, addressing the deep trench be-
tween bodily enclosed human sensations and calculative knowledge. From a 
practitioner’s perspective, the translation of a cognitively, for-the-most-part 
inaccessible body is one of the main challenges of self-quantification. This 
most of all applies to our living body, as the following quote illustrates:  
Most people know what hunger feels like. But do you know what a calorie 
deficit of 500 calories feels like – compared to a deficit of 750 calories? And 
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what does a difference in your mood mean if you rate your happiness as 7 
vs. 8 on a scale from 1 to 10? (Sophie)2 
Questions like these typically emerge in the context of self-tracking. They 
point to a central issue in this field: the emergence and establishment of con-
ventions for assigning numerical values to people’s bodies, behavioral pat-
terns, and – not least – emotions. In the following, we shed light on how in-
vestment in form is introduced within specific communities of practices of 
self-quantification. Thereby, we address the problem of how conventions of 
health are situated within the everyday lives of single actors, addressing coor-
dination problems characteristic of contemporary societies. Convention the-
ory in general highlights the practical capabilities of actors enmeshed in con-
ventions (Desrosières 2011; Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011; Diaz-Bone and Didier 
2016). Conventions in the meaning of the economics of convention and the 
sociology of critique (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) are “logics of coordina-
tion.” These logics may not be reduced to blunt instruments for given pur-
poses; rather, they have strong normative rootings and implications. There-
fore, orders of worth are at least as much moral frames for interpretation and 
valuation as they are legal and cognitive frames.  
In the following, we pursue the thesis that within the field of self-tracking, 
something new is socially negotiated and, eventually, brought into being: col-
lectively valid orders of worth for individual everyday activities, for compe-
tences tied to the body and its history, i.e., immaterial capital tied to the sub-
ject, for whose manifold aspects no widely accepted forms of representation 
and valuation have yet been found. Self-tracking can thus be understood as a 
gigantic laboratory spread across the globe, in which people integrate, adapt, 
or develop technical procedures and normative criteria by means of which 
they categorize and compare their concrete differences. On the one hand, 
self-tracking practices are based on the emphatic emphasis on one’s own dis-
tinctiveness (“N=1!”), on the other hand, however, they might finally produce 
collectively binding taxonomies of the self. Self-tracking therefore implies 
specific investment in form (Thévenot 1983) which the subjects integrate into 
their lives or perhaps, more precisely, co-produce in order to connect with 
one another and contemporary economy and culture in general. Although 
self-trackers’ activities often remain private, they are nonetheless sociologi-
cally relevant. In particular, Laurent Thévenot “enlarged the notion of coor-
dinative powers to personal capacities or abilities that imply coordinating 
with oneself and are a prerequisite for coordination with others” (Thévenot 
2014, 11). In order for coordination to be possible, expectations about the be-
havior of others are required. However, these expectations also relate to how 
actors coordinate with themselves. According to Thévenot (2002, 69), public 
 
 
2  For reasons of anonymization and better understanding, the names of the interviewed persons 
are fictitious. 
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justification requires both emotional involvement and moral infrastructure. 
Thévenot, in a conceptual move towards differentiating specific regimes of 
interacting with the world – introduces a “dual view” here: one is focused on 
justifications in public, drawing on obligatory, albeit subconscious conven-
tions; the other on modes of coordinating with oneself: “Such a dual view is 
needed if we want to account for the interrelated metamorphoses of modes 
of government and of selves […]” (Thévenot 2014, 9). Power and self have to 
be interlinked, and Thévenot’s “regimes of engagement” are understood as 
unveiling the hidden forms of how the self is being able to interact with itself, 
which in turn is a prerequisite for engaging in public in the first place. These 
engagements are “based on a variety of relations to the world” (ibid., 11). Ac-
tors can engage in an individual plan, in the course of which they see the 
world functionally in order to achieve a set goal. They can engage in familiar-
ity, which means that they value the world in terms of features like simplicity 
or convenience. Here, actors develop a bond, as in close friendships or in ar-
eas of intimacy. Or they can engage in exploration, a playful approach to the 
world that involves excitement and surprise (Thévenot 2014). The emphasis 
– as with all varieties of conventionalist thinking – remains on the compe-
tence of the actors, insofar as they can change their engagement depending 
on the situation. However, the possibilities of engagement as well as the con-
tinuity of the self-depend on specific environments which have been pre-
pared, or in other words, formatted (Thévenot 2014, 12). 
But “forms” and “formats” for coordinating action do not come into effect 
without altering the world. Actually, their very purpose is to rearrange the 
entities of the social world in such a way that coordination becomes possible 
in the first place: “Shaping people and things in conventional forms produces 
capacities – or powers – to communicate and coordinate, that are needed for 
living in human communities” (Thévenot 2014, 10). Accordingly, in our cases 
we will analyze the field-specific investment in form by concentrating on this 
process of rearrangement. We regard this as a “double transformation” of 
materialities and doings into numbers and calculations. We are going to ana-
lyze two specific practices: diet-tracking and mood-tracking, which differ in 
regard to the standardization of the corresponding investment in form. By 
asking how diet- and mood-trackers employ, adapt, and integrate (more or 
less established and standardized) numerical investment in form into their 
everyday body and health practices, we address the resistiveness of the in-
volved bodies and objects, specifically the inaccuracy of measuring, the cum-
bersome materiality of objects and everyday practice, and the fuzzy relation 
of doing and measuring. Investment in form above all means to invest in the 
coherence of the entities involved so people and objects may be treated “in 
homogenous ways across contexts” (Thévenot 2002, 56), thereby essentially 
transforming them into something different. Getting to grips with 
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resistiveness means to extend the limits of valuing to immaterial capacities 
(health) and thereby to shift the existing “margins of accounting” (Miller 
1998). 
Research in institutional health economics (e.g., Batifoulier et al. 2013; Bati-
foulier 2018; Da Silva 2018) discusses and highlights the role of values and the 
quantification of health outcomes, observing, e.g., a shift from welfare state 
organizational principles to market-economic organizational principles, par-
ticularly in French and other European health systems (Da Silva 2018, Bati-
foulier 2018). The introduction of evidence-based medicine in the 1980s in the 
form of practitioners’ clinical experience, state-of-the-art clinical research, 
and data collection on current treatments as a factual basis (Staii 2018, 199) 
was accompanied by continuous standardization efforts (Da Silva 2011), on 
the basis of statistical distributions against the background of collective data 
(Staii 2018, 200). This form of data collection to generate medical facts has 
been continuously expanded and, at the political level, standardization ef-
forts have gradually been extended (Da Silva 2011). 
This epistemic change through the datafication of health (Ruckenstein and 
Schüll 2017) is accompanied by new data infrastructures. The networking of 
new (individualized) data with old health data particularly promotes individ-
ualized, predictive, and preventive medicine. As empowered patients, actors 
are thus being made increasingly responsible for their health (Staii 2018, 199), 
but at the same time their orientation towards the common good is not being 
taken into account (Batifoulier 2011, 153; Ruckenstein and Schüll 2017, 272). 
Furthermore, economic policy attempts – under the umbrella of patient em-
powerment or “digitally engaged patients” (Lupton 2013) – to promote active, 
well-informed patients in order to give them market power and thus make 
the field of health accessible as a market (Batifoulier 2011). Swan character-
izes these patient-driven health care services as “having an increased level of 
information flow, transparency, customization, collaboration and patient 
choice and responsibility-taking, as well as quantitative, predictive and pre-
ventive aspects” (Swan 2009, 492), while the health outcomes vary between 
cure, improvement, normalization, prevention, enhancement, and self-ex-
pression. The introduction of patient-generated content through self-track-
ing creates patient-driven health care models, which change not only the role 
of patients, but also of physicians, health insurances, science, or the concept 
of health (Swan 2009; Lupton 2013). With the newly emerging data economy 
in the field of health, the problem of the lack of open negotiation processes 
on common goals, values, and qualities in the field of health is therefore fur-
ther intensified (Ajana 2017): On the one hand because of the new actors and 
infrastructures in the health sector (Staii 2018, 202); and on the other hand 
because their concerns are even more obscured by the datafication processes 
and technologies. 
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Tamar Sharon (2018) has added a new perspective, demonstrating how con-
temporary health research by major consumer technology corporations is 
woven into various moral logics and accordingly integrates different notions 
of the common good. In recent years, a whole series of largely standardized 
products for alleged improvement in individual health by self-quantification 
have become popular (e.g., Google Fit, Apple Health, Samsung S-Health, 
etc.). At the same time, these products support a combination of conventions 
that Sharon has identified as dominant for health research. On the one hand, 
in the vitalist repertoire, health is held up as a general good, both for the in-
dividual and for social groups and humanity as a whole: “Here, good health, 
life and vitality are upheld as the highest values, (human) life and its prolifer-
ation is understood as having intrinsic value, the pursuit of the good life is 
framed in terms of the quest for Health” (Sharon 2018, 7). On the other hand, 
this pursuit of health should now be made possible by quantitative means, 
thereby transporting industrial logics of efficiency and optimization into the 
everyday lives of users: “The industrial repertoire is a dominant one in the 
context of healthcare today, where digital technologies promise to propel 
medicine forward through early diagnosis, the development of precision 
treatments and the rendering efficient of inefficient healthcare systems” 
(Sharon 2018, 6). In the case of self-measurement, there is a new factor that it 
is not physicians who generate knowledge about patients via measurement 
methods, but it is the self-trackers who generate knowledge about themselves 
and thus become experts in themselves. 
By asking to what extent this industrial logic finds its way into users’ every-
day lives through quantification, our perspective is in line with an internalist 
perspective as a starting point, as proposed by Diaz-Bone and Didier (2016) 
for a sociology of quantification, which requires categories and quantifica-
tions to be interpreted and applied by competent actors, meaning that these 
entities only emerge in situations. Or as Salais puts it: “Quantification is plu-
ral” (Salais 2016, 132), which “means that any quantification process has to be 
situated, for the choices of what and how to quantify depend of the situation, 
the activity, the people, and their principles of justice” (ibid.). In practice, this 
means that while users are directly affected by a vitalist call to individual 
health, measurement techniques transport notions of accuracy and effi-
ciency, which can be quite troublesome to integrate into daily lives. Accord-
ingly, users must find an adequate balance between the precision of the 
measurements and the livability of everyday life, or in other words: a balance 
between conventions conveyed by the objects and their personal ways of be-
ing engaged, for example engaging in an individual plan or engaging in fa-
miliarity. The concept of adequacy is directly related to normative accounts 
of how and why tracking should be done. While users of diet-tracking appli-
cations can rely on a set of already standardized measures such as calorie and 
weight, this is not the case for mood-tracking, as different approaches 
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compete with each other and it is unclear what the best way could be to trans-
late emotions into numbers. Therefore, uncertainties about correct ways of 
measurement and representation are accompanied by uncertainties about 
the right measure of mood and well-being in general. 
2. Methodological Approach: Transformation Problems 
and the Limits of Measurement 
The methodological design followed the principles of grounded theory 
(Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1996) in order to investigate the emerging 
and changing practices and taxonomies of self-tracking in a flexible and 
methodologically open procedure. The underlying inductive research logic 
and the alternating phases of data collection and data analysis allowed for a 
continuous adjustment of the methodological procedure, the data (satura-
tion) and – within limits – also the underlying research question. In this re-
spect, grounded theory proved to be the appropriate instrument in the con-
text of a sometimes rapidly developing research subject, which is reflected 
not only in the sometimes rather volatile, short-term and changing surveying 
practices of self-tracking, but also in the embedding of sensors in everyday 
objects such as watches or mobile phones. Among other things, the quality 
criteria of object adequacy and theoretical penetration (Strübing et al. 2018) 
have repeatedly generated new research questions from the empirical mate-
rial. 
In total, more than 100 data entries were collected, including interviews and 
group discussions with self-trackers, observations of their self-tracking prac-
tices, and expert interviews with stakeholders (such as developers of self-
tracking devices) and participatory observations in the QS-community. They 
cover different fields of self-tracking – such as fitness, performance, sports, 
mood, and health – and different levels of self-tracking expertise – ranging 
from casual to professional self-trackers. The following descriptions and 
findings are mainly based on interviews and a group discussion with strength 
athletes on diet-tracking and interviews with and Show-and-Tell-talks of the 
Quantified Self-community about mood-tracking.  
Based on this empirical research, we contrast two application areas of self-
measurement: diet tracking and mood tracking. Both fields have a health im-
pact. However, they differ greatly in many aspects. While diet-trackers can 
relate to a long history of measuring in the sports and health sectors and can 
use standardized quantities such as calorie or kilogram largely unquestioned, 
this is not the case in mood-tracking, as attempts to quantify feelings can be 
regarded as quite new and unexplored (Vormbusch and Kappler 2014). In 
other words, diet-trackers can access investment in form that are not (yet) 
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available for mood-tracking. It follows, that we can observe quite different 
approaches to transformations of materiality and doings into numbers. On 
the one hand, a double transformation is to be assumed in diet-tracking, since 
in most cases it is a question of accounting for both a form of input and a form 
of output. Accordingly, diet-trackers attempt to account for food intake and 
activity-consumed calories. Mood trackers, on the other hand, are confronted 
with a great variety of measurements and units of measurement, as the quan-
tified measurement of mood is not yet standardized. What we characterize in 
the following as a transformation problem, is from the participant perspec-
tive a challenge to deal with various forms of inaccuracy or, as in the case of 
mood tracking, the question of what it is that can and should be measured. 
Based on these transformation problems, it can be seen how users in every-
day life are confronted with investment in form (Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016; 
Thévenot 1983; Desrosières 2007), and, depending on the level of standardi-
zation as well as the material and practical obstacles, how they handle them, 
how they stretch or adjust them, or even how they break with them. 
3. Diet-Tracking: The Resistiveness of Established 
Numerical Investment in Form in Everyday Health 
Practices 
Diet-tracking is a practice in which people measure their nutrition in terms 
of various parameters such as calories and micro- and macronutrients. This 
can be done to pursue a variety of goals. Some users want to get an overview 
of their diet. Others want to approximate a healthier lifestyle or an appear-
ance which they consider more attractive or more capable. Such goals are 
usually linked to the parameter weight as a dependent variable. At the same 
time, weight serves as a test of the effectiveness of the tracking practices, as 
it is the weight that should change. A commonly used formula to make weight 
changes calculable is the accounting of ingested and burnt calories. It is 
called “calories in, calories out” (CICO). All major apps for diet-tracking work 
on this principle, e.g., MyFitnessPal or FoodDataBase. However, it is not only 
the apps that have made this popular. The career of the calorie began at the 
end of the 19th century, when Wilbur Olin Atwater started to perform nutri-
tional studies using a “calorimeter, a device previously used to measure the 
combustive efficiency of explosives and engines” (Cullather 2007, 340). As 
large as a room, this instrument enabled the energetic measurement of food 
intake and energy consumption through activities. Hundreds of similar ex-
periments followed: “Proceeding from a Taylorist conception of a mechano-
morphic body, Atwater led an effort by manufacturers, municipalities, and 
the federal government to set scientific ‘standards of living’ that could be used 
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to contain wage levels while maintaining a healthy, contented workforce” 
(Cullather 2007, 343). The quantification of food and activities found its cor-
respondent in the measurement of body weight in kilograms (Zillien et al. 
2016, 125). Guidebooks like Diet and Health by Lulu Hunt Peters took up the 
concept of calorie and popularized calorie counting as early as 1918. Although 
never free of criticism, counting calories has become an increasingly recom-
mended way to lose weight. But to make reliable statements about the weight 
usually requires the bathroom scale, which in turn goes back to a history of 
domestication starting with the scales in public places in the early 20th cen-
tury. In order to maintain their normalizing power, however, another supple-
ment was needed, namely charts that normalized body weight in relation to 
height: “Together, the scale and the height and weight chart became a pow-
erful dual technology for defining normalcy” (Crawford et al. 2015, 483). This 
indicates that diet-tracker can rely on substantial investment in form, as the 
apps refer to scientifically engineered classifications and calculations. While 
the rationale seems simple, difficulties arise in implementation. 
One side of – what we call – the double transformation problem in diet 
tracking is thus to obtain an adequate estimate of the calories ingested. On 
the one hand, users need to find out how many grams of a particular food 
they eat, mostly by weighing each ingredient with a kitchen scale. On the 
other hand, they must have information about caloric density and other rele-
vant ingredients. To provide this information, diet-tracking apps include da-
tabases. These databases can be filled by the users themselves (thereby acting 
as producer and consumer of relevant data alike), so that missing ingredients 
can be continuously updated, for example by reading the appropriate infor-
mation from packaging or researching it on the Internet and subsequently 
feeding the database with this data. Some apps include the possibility to scan 
barcodes, so that nutritional records are added in a time-saving way. How-
ever and as a result, it is not uncommon that there may be differing infor-
mation for a particular ingredient or a ready meal, indicating some lack of 
standardization. Most users decide between these options from the gut, un-
less they are currently holding the package with nutritional charts in their 
hands. In addition, the databases are usually only available online, so that it 
cannot be tracked if there is no Internet access available. Users must then 
enter this later. If they no longer have the nutritional information and quan-
tities, they often estimate it. 
The other side of the double transformation lies in the fact that in order to 
gain/lose weight, this calorie-intake must be higher/lower than the consump-
tion of calories due to daily activities as well as the basal metabolic rate. Con-
sequently, these activities must also be translated into calories in order to re-
late them with the calories actually ingested. Common diet-tracking-apps try 
to make the process of accounting as easy as possible. To calculate the basal 
metabolic rate, users must specify gender, age, and body weight. Depending 
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on these parameters, steps taken via pedometers are converted into extra cal-
ories consumed. To simplify counting steps and because users do not always 
have their smartphones with them, the apps can be paired with wearables 
that detect the steps and sometimes the heart rate independently of the 
smartphone. While pulse measurement increases accuracy, it also reduces 
battery life, which is why many users turn off pulse measurement. There are 
also questions about the position of the sensor on the body. Wearables on the 
wrist or the smartphone in the trouser pocket on the hip, the pulse measure-
ment on the wrist or the chest strap, they all have different advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of precision and everyday practicality. For example, 
optical pulse measurements on the wrist often struggle with the problem that 
they become increasingly inaccurate due to sweat between the sensor and the 
skin. The interaction of counting the steps and the pulse measurement also 
shows that these applications were mostly developed for everyday walking 
and running. Sports that are not essentially based on leg movements cannot 
be represented in this way. One interviewee told us that his Fitbit had not rec-
orded his bench pressing. He told us that the Fitbit checks the pulse only in 
longer time intervals, so it does not notice the short load phases, unless they 
are accompanied by a rapid increase in the pacing rate of steps, which serves 
as a signal to the device. So basically only running sports can be measured 
automatically. To track other activities, users must select the type of activity 
from a list, enter the duration of the activity, and sometimes give an intensity 
rating. The latter can alternatively also be replaced by the pulse measure-
ment. The app then calculates an estimate based on the metabolic equivalent 
of task (MET), which is a ratio at which a person is expending energy relative 
to its mass – one MET is roughly equivalent to sitting quietly (Ainsworth et al. 
1993).  
In this context, material resistance to measuring is ubiquitous in our data. 
Users clearly differ in how they practically deal with these difficulties that is, 
how they deal with inaccuracies, with resisting materialities, and with the 
process of measuring. To demonstrate this, we focus on a group of strength 
athletes whose goal is to build muscle and, in that sense, gain weight. Their 
motivation is very sports-oriented or performance-oriented. However, they 
have started for health-related reasons – from latent underweight to heavy 
overweight. We further contrast their statements with the diet-tracking prac-
tices of health-oriented self-trackers, by caring for their nutrition, monitoring 
a dietary change or addressing health problems through weight reduction 
and control. Throughout our interviews, very different assessments of meas-
urement inaccuracies – culminating in contradictory constructions such as 
“approximately accurate” (Alex) – emerge. On the one hand, for some inter-
viewees and in some periods of diet-tracking it seems to be important that, 
for example, calorie measurements are carried out as accurately as possible, 
since they are the basis for the dietary intake under changing conditions (e.g., 
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days on which one trained hard for the strength athletes). On the other hand, 
there are several statements in the interviews, referring to – what could be 
called – “acceptable inaccuracy of measurement.” Alex, for example, states 
that “broccoli has only 20 calories, anyway” (Alex) and represents in fact a 
negligible amount of calories. Nevertheless, broccoli is “weighed quickly” 
(Alex) and therefore included in the tracking. The same strength athlete ac-
cepts a rough estimate of 500 burnt calories for his strength training. While 
strength training cannot be tracked automatically, it nonetheless appears as 
an unusual imbalance in accuracy in contrast of what could and should be 
expected according to an industrial logic, which requires that all relevant pa-
rameters are recorded with the utmost precision. If this was not possible, you 
could expect that the legitimacy of the practice was questioned. In fact, one 
of our health-oriented self-trackers justified the abandonment of self-track-
ing in line with this thought, among other reasons: 
You had to weigh everything before and then think about it, yes, I add a little 
bit now and then you have thought: Oh, fuck it, that's just 10 calories prob-
ably and that’s why it was not precise. That has lost meaning. (Barbara) 
While Barbara was unable to reconcile self-tracking with her claim to ade-
quate accuracy and her notion of a healthy diet, the group of strength athletes 
does not doubt the usefulness of self-tracking despite obvious inaccuracies. 
So how do the athletes justify such imbalances in terms of accuracy of meas-
urements on the one hand versus rough estimates on the other? First of all, it 
should be noted that the group of strength athletes evaluates digital diet-
tracking as an enormous facilitation and time saving in so far as they have for 
a long time conducted nutritional balances with paper and pencil and drawn 
up training and nutrition plans to be adhered to in excel-sheets. Through 
their many years of involvement with the topics of sports, nutrition, muscle 
building, and fat loss, they have accumulated a great deal of expert 
knowledge. Against this backdrop, they initially justify their self-tracking 
practices as facilitating their work: 
I: And you say you've been engaged with this before. How do you describe 
your previous knowledge? 
B: For example, I just calculated with a calculator in table form. How much 
I have eaten and then made comparisons […]. And that’s just, of course, 
much easier with the app, because it calculates everything automatically. 
So you just type that in, what you have eaten, and then it gets directly con-
verted and then it shows you your daily requirement. And that’s just a cal-
culation work of, I do not know, a quarter of an hour or something more, 
which is just saved every day or every evening. (Max) 
It should be noted, that other users who have little experience with CICO ac-
counting can find the practice of tracking every meal quite tedious, like in 
Barbara’s case. The strength athletes, however, value mobility and the flexi-
bility that diet-tracking offers on the smartphone. In this regard, particular 
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emphasis is placed on real-time feedback, which, compared to a diet plan and 
handwritten notation of meals, enables the individual daily routine to be flex-
ibly adapted to the calorie balance: 
Otherwise, otherwise you just stick to the pre-calculated amount that some-
one writes down for you. Yes, you can eat 100 grams of rice, two pieces of 
turkey, a curd, and then you can cry yourself to sleep. You know? And if, if 
you do that flexibly, with a tracking app, you can, if you monitor it yourself, 
you can choose it. You can go and eat a piece of cake with people, you know 
it still fits, and then you can adjust the rest of the day with more activity. 
That’s much, much, much better. (Alex) 
How exactly the balance must turn out depends on the specific phase, the 
strength athletes are currently in. They alter phases of muscle gain – which is 
impossible without weight and fat gain – with phases of fat loss. Hence, they 
are periodically switching between a calorie surplus in which they build mus-
cle, but inevitably also fat, and a calorie deficit, in which they get rid of the 
fat again. In surplus phases, both sides of the transformation problem are in-
accurately measured, because, according to them, only the existence of a bal-
ance surplus is important: 
So in surplus I do not care. In surplus, I certainly do not track vegetables, 
because that makes 300 calories and if I gain one kilo after a week, or one 
point five kilos, after all I don’t care. (Alex) 
In deficit phases, however, “everything above the calorie density of an onion” 
(Alex) is measured. So much stricter accuracy requirements are applied – at 
least as far as the conscientiousness of the measurement of food is con-
cerned, since the estimates of their workouts remain unaffected. Addition-
ally, it is the body itself that brings inaccuracies into play on both sides of the 
transformation problem, which is why inaccuracies cannot be avoided any-
way. On the one hand, the calorie consumption of activities depends on the 
general fitness of the self-tracker, which can only roughly be estimated. On 
the other hand, the absorption of calories depends on the metabolism. In this 
sense, one of our strength athletes sums up: 
One has anyway, food has a fluctuation anyway, training has a slight fluctu-
ation, everything is subject to fluctuations. That’s why you cannot do it 
100%. You also have to decide for yourself how much effort you want to put 
in it, right? (Alex) 
Even for the strength athletes, the claim for accuracy is subordinated to what 
they consider reasonable or acceptable of being integrated into their every-
day lives. So while engaging in an individual plan (accurate tracking to 
achieve weight goals) is important, it still has to be weighed against engaging 
in familiarity. Accordingly, the highest possible degree of precision – follow-
ing the logic of the industrial convention (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) – 
would require too much effort. Hence, the practice of diet-tracking implies a 
continuous weighing of effort – put into the calculation – and precision of the 
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self-tracking practices. The test, guiding the above mentioned process of ac-
counting, simply consists of the fact, that the self-tracking “simply works” or 
that despite all inaccuracies the outcome fits the targeted outcome, according 
to Alex: 
Well, where I was on maintenance calories, I definitely did not gain weight, 
so I guess, first of all, I’ve done that meticulously enough and second, the 
app works quite well with the estimates. (Alex) 
This “good enough” also shows that the strength athletes depend on the re-
sult, not so much on the numerical values themselves. Corresponding to this, 
in the group discussion, the strength-athletes present their tracking practices 
and the relationship to inaccuracies of the measurement as a trial-and-error 
procedure: 
If you take that and then say okay with that value I’ve lost a bit of weight, but 
not what I want, I want to lose weight faster, then I’ll increase that a bit. You 
can use it well, above all, you can take it, not necessarily to see the exact cal-
orie requirements, but for example to compare your activity. At least if you 
know how they work. For example, they are susceptible to gestures of your 
hand. And if I watch out that I do not cheat, then I have feedback on how ac-
tive I am. That is, if I do not lose weight anymore, I may have been less active. 
But I believe only very, very few use it like that. (Peter) 
The strength athletes therefore use self-tracking to make comparisons with 
themselves via a kind of trial-and-error procedure and in this way gain expe-
rience about their calorie balance, with which they gain control over weight 
gain and weight loss as unerringly as possible. The test for CICO-formula con-
sists in being “accurate enough” to achieve the goal. This is the minimum re-
quirement and any inaccuracies beyond this seem to be tolerated. In this 
sense, the numerical investment in form of the corresponding industrial con-
vention is attenuated by a permanent loop between testing and readjust-
ments. 
In these continuous feedback-loops, diet-trackers deal with resistances and 
associated inaccuracies on both sides of the transformation problem, often 
by developing counter-practices. For example, the strength athletes avoid 
places of public consumption of food, since it is sometimes difficult to obtain 
the correct calorie information. Another practice is the consumption of more 
ready meals, as the scanning of the corresponding barcodes reduces inaccu-
racies and saves time in tracking, as they directly refer to the caloric content. 
Similarly, other diet-trackers tend to eat whole packages of food, e.g., a whole 
bag of frozen broccoli, and prefer packaged vegetables to fresh vegetables. In 
the extreme, this leads to a standardization of food products, as known from 
system gastronomy. In this respect, the measurement (or tracking) methods 
can intervene intrusively in everyday life. This is in line with Thévenot’s note 
that “an environment has to be prepared or shaped within proper ‘formats’ to 
support a particular regime of engaging with it” (Thévenot 2014, 12). But 
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processes of negotiation usually show up, in which a balance is made be-
tween the requirements of measuring methods and the requirements of one’s 
own lifestyle, between engaging in an individual plan and engaging in famil-
iarity or in exploration. 
4. Mood-Tracking: The Resistiveness of Establishing 
Numerical Investment in Form in Everyday Health 
Practices 
Mood-tracking is a practice in which people measure their mood, either by 
proactively entering their current subjective sensation of mood or by the au-
tomatic recognition of physiological parameters which are taken as an ap-
proximation of the emotional state. The motivation to track one’s mood and 
to find more adequate forms to do so emerges either from medical and clini-
cal needs, such as assessing and controlling emotional disorders, or from an 
interest in the pursuit of happiness. 
Historically, the way people refer to themselves and their mood(s) has 
taken a variety of forms, particularly before numbers and calculations have 
been applied to measuring the self (Noji and Vormbusch 2018). For example, 
one of the first institutions of self-inspection has been established within the 
framework of confessing one’s guilt (Hahn 1982). In this context, there were 
two further steps in the evolution of confession, understood as an early social 
institution of self-thematization: first, the focus of sin analysis shifted from 
looking at external actions to internal intentions and motives in the 12th cen-
tury, thereby socializing emotions (Hahn 2000) and increasing the sense of 
one’s own subjectivity; second, and since the time of the European Refor-
mation, life observation and life confession have been systematized and inte-
grated into everyday life, mostly in the form of diaries and reflected in the 
genre of novel writing since the 18th century. Consequently, the practice of 
confession and self-thematization has been institutionalized for quite a long 
time already, drawing attention to the exploration of one’s own inner life, 
one’s own emotions, feelings, and moods. This connection between self-in-
quiry and self-control can also be found in mood-tracking (Pritz 2016,131). 
Yet, despite this history of self-thematization and mood description and re-
cording and while strength athletes refer to standardized measured variables 
with calories and weight (both as body weight and weight in terms of perfor-
mance, e.g., when pressing a bench), mood-tracking contains a range of pro-
found uncertainties. Since feelings were mostly treated in the form of lan-
guage, it is unclear what the adequate measurables may be and in which 
procedures and representation formats those measures can be handled. 
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In this sense, a large number of different forms of measuring, recording, 
and reflecting of mood can be observed (Pritz 2016). On the one hand, there 
is a wide range of apps that require the active input of their users. These apps 
ask – sometimes proactively – the self-trackers to answer a couple of ques-
tions about their current state of mood. Depending on the app, the mood can 
be described by selecting the fitting term from a range of predetermined 
words, by choosing a value from an ordinal scale (ranging from 1 to 8, 1 to 10, 
or even 1 to 100 as in the case of the app “trackyourhappiness,”3 or by picking 
the corresponding “smiley” or emoticon (see Pritz 2016, 132; Vormbusch and 
Kappler 2014). As a rule of thumb, the low values are associated with “un-
happy” and the high values with “happy.” More sophisticated services and 
apps allow a more complex mapping of the state of happiness, using, e.g., 
cross tables combining two dimensions: “arousal” (ranging from “angry” to 
“relaxed) and “feeling” (ranging from “sad” to “happy”; cf. interview with 
Steve). Depending on where the self-trackers ablate their feelings on this xy 
axis system, the colour of the entire square changes and the state of happi-
ness is assigned to adjectives such as “frustrated.” 
On the other hand, there are first approaches that try to measure mood au-
tomatically, recording body information by sensors and deriving a mood 
from the measured body-value (see Oh and Lee 2015, 54). Wearables enable 
immediate recording of physiological data such as neuronal activities, heart 
rate variability (HRV), or skin conductance (cf. Malhi et al. 2017, 104). Using 
these automated measurement techniques, changes are determined which 
then analytically are associated with emotions (cf. Vormbusch and Kappler 
2018, 220). Other approaches use activity data recorded by smartphones – 
such as number of visited places, patterns of communication or movement, 
telephone usage activities, number of phone calls, degree of physical activity 
– to derive the users’ mood and specifically the existence and severity of a 
depressive period (Servia-Rodríguez et al. 2017; Malhi et al. 2017).  
The aim of this variety of approaches is a multi-coloured statistical overview 
of one’s own emotional world and sensitivities in the form of word clouds, 
progression curves or frequency distributions, named and documented by 
means of special software on the computer, tablet, or smartphone (see Pritz 
2016, 133). But there is no consensus or standard on the adequate measura-
bles, procedures, and representation formats, such as seen in our interview 
data and observations of the Quantified-Self community. One of our inter-
viewees describes how emoticons are used to measure mood, as it is appar-
ently uncertain which point on a scale to choose: 
[…] and then I have this slider, which goes from zero to... I think it is actu-
ally divided in the middle, so you get five points to the left and then that is 
the best mood, for example, and to the right, and it is a good mood. And I 
 
 
3   www.trackyourhappiness.org. 
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also have this little smiley feedback. So, I put the slider and then I can see 
the smiley and it helps me to adjust, I think “No, not that happy, or...”, you 
know, so that gives me kind of feedback to see, if I scored right on the scale. 
[…] it is just on the continuum happy versus not happy. (Sandra) 
Another indicator for the lacking consensus in mood-tracking are the contro-
versial debates among mood-trackers on the respective advantages of a nu-
merical or text-based representation of their mood: 
[...] I also feel very reductionist if I would do it by numbers, so if I would 
score it. I am just curious if other people have experiences with things that 
are a bit more elaborated than a number, but not as free flow as words or 
things. [...] The structure does not help you with emotions, because it is a 
structure, you do not need a structure but a flow. (Deborah) 
What is being discussed here in public is the question of how to capture feel-
ings adequately. The previously established narrative formats like diaries 
seem too free and unstructured for Deborah. Numbers, on the other hand, 
seem to give too much structure and are accordingly too reductive. Instead, 
she is looking for a format that allows a “flow,” so emotions are not sup-
pressed and yet structured in some way. Obviously, her previously estab-
lished formats do not seem appropriate for her, so she is looking for new 
forms.  
Beyond the assignment of a value to a perceived “state of happiness,” most 
apps allow further information about the social context, e.g., where you are, 
what you are doing, who you are with, etc. These are then linked together for 
further analysis. Additionally, it is common to correlate the perceived state of 
mood with other measured data in order to find out which factors have an 
effect on the perceived happiness. John relates his mood-tracking data to psy-
chological theories in order to obtain information about factors that influ-
ence the emotional state: 
So what I am trying to do is to derive my personal formula that includes all 
the different variables and factors in my life that kind of influence and de-
fine happiness. Last December, I started tracking data points in my every-
day life in order to test some psychological and behavioural theories of hap-
piness. (John) 
Using psychological theories, John has tried to relate his daily routine to a 
measure of his state of health. His attempt to find a kind of happiness formula 
can be read as an equivalent for the production of the CICO formula, but this 
seems to be reaching its limits: 
So, my theory was, I will see how the way I live my life, by everyday activi-
ties, is related to my happiness. I put together a list of activities that I usually 
do during the day, about fourteen or fifteen, and at the end of each day, I 
took a look on how much time I spend on these activities in minutes. And 
then I also computed an average happiness level for that day. And then I 
just ran the correlations, [...] The problem with this model is, it is kind of 
difficult, even for me, […] it is kind of hard to say, sometimes, what variable 
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is the cause and which is the effect. Did I feel unhappy because I worked 
hard/too much or did I have to work much because I was not happy. […] So, 
based on this formula, based on these results I kind of derived a partial for-
mula. It was inconclusive. [...] So, at this point, what I know is there is no 
solid conclusion yet, there is no final product, there is no data, there is no 
formula of happiness. But I did learn that happiness can be quantified and 
so can be the factors that influence the happiness. (John) 
John explains that even for him it was difficult which variable actually causes 
which effect. Interestingly, these failures do not seem to lead John to give up 
belief in the possibility of measuring happiness. On the contrary, John thinks 
he has learned that one can quantify happiness, only he has failed to provide 
the necessary investment in form. Nevertheless, the question of whether ex-
periences of happiness could be calculated with the help of an integrated 
“world happiness formula” (John) – analogous to the CICO-formula in diet-
tracking – is doubted by many self-trackers. Even the goal of a consistent 
quantification of emotional experience is highly controversial.  
Consequently, and despite many efforts and intents, there are currently no 
uniform models in the form of metrics, forms of practice, and rules for mak-
ing mood or happiness accessible, assessable, and optimizable (cf. Vorm-
busch and Kappler 2018, 208). Hence, the current form of “writing mood” is 
highly volatile, unstable, and little standardized, with ongoing quite different 
investment in form. These difficulties in finding the right “formula” and ap-
propriate forms in general also indicate that the immaterial object of the 
measurement appears to be much less clear-cut than is the case in diet-track-
ing with calories. This includes the far-reaching uncertainty about the object 
of mood-tracking itself. For the interviewees, it is not self-evident what is to 
be measured and what can be made visible by it: 
What I measured was happiness and I sort of wondered, is it really happi-
ness or should I be measuring satisfaction, or accomplishments or, you 
know. (Deven) 
To me, that is more like looking at the level of frustration or some sort of... 
like the level of how liberated I am every day. (Marc) 
Satisfaction, the achievement of goals, frustration, and freedom, all these 
feelings are associated with the concept of “happiness.” So the self-trackers 
do not seem to be sure what they should measure: happiness, satisfaction, 
frustration, among many other possibilities. This may have something to do 
with the fact that, as the next interview extract shows, happiness cannot ap-
parently be measured without influencing the state of happiness itself: “What 
I learnt – I can’t measure happiness without affecting it” (Deven).  
No suitable “conventional forms” seem to have yet been found that enable 
self-coordination with regard to mood. Nevertheless, the attempt to measure 
mood has performative effects – at least on the mood itself that is to be meas-
ured. In contrast to diet tracking, in which some actors change their practices 
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more or less consciously, for example by not visiting restaurants, this seems 
to be far less controllable in mood tracking due to the uncertain form. 
5. Discussion 
Comparing diet- and mood-tracking, we come across two fields that fall back 
on established investment in form to varying degrees. While diet-trackers can 
rely on largely standardized measures such as calorie or weight in relation to 
body height, it is still unclear in the field of mood-tracking which form of 
quantifying makes sense, with which variables it should be related, and 
which representative formats should be used for this. This is one of the rea-
sons why in the Quantified Self-community, diet-tracking is considered rela-
tively unspectacular and many discussions turn rather to not yet established 
methods such as mood-tracking. Since the unit and procedure of measure-
ment are not yet standardized, questions on the integration in everyday life 
and thus about resistances and (in)accuracies – as they are discussed in diet-
tracking – are less obvious here, because first of all it has to be figured out 
what should be measured at all – and how. While the limits of measuring in 
diet-tracking are mostly about convenience and a resistant materiality that 
cannot be measured as desired and is sometimes adapted performatively, 
mood-tracking still deals with questions like whether happiness can be meas-
ured at all because of its immateriality and volatility (Vormbusch and Kappler 
2014). Nonetheless, there is a constant effort in particular to make feelings 
accessible to quantification – to the point of trying to create a kind of happi-
ness formula, as we have seen by the example of John. We expect that with 
increasing standardization, these questions could shift towards issues of an 
adequate implementation in everyday life, as is the case in diet tracking. 
Accordingly, what is considered adequate in the respective fields of diet and 
mood tracking varies. However, we do not consider the considerations in-
volved in this regard as a private matter alone. Thévenot (2014, 13) argues that 
the established distinctions between public and private, as well as between 
individual and collective, make it difficult to fully grasp a person’s composi-
tion and engagement. Referring to the concept of engagements and pushing 
it further, we suggest that even in private individuals will consider public val-
uation. For the regime of the individual plan this means, for example, to 
gauge which goals appear worth choosing, and which means are allowed or 
reputable for them. For the regime of familiarity, this means asking yourself 
which people and objects can or may be integrated into intimate relationships 
and what forms of appreciation this may possibly violate. Self-trackers are 
also concerned about public discourses that accompany their doings and 
achievements. Many self-trackers routinely anticipate possible criticism and 
are actively downplaying the rigidity of their activities or, conversely, 
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presenting self-tracking as the right solution to problems that others fail to 
address. For example, the self-trackers in our group discussion opposed in-
vasive forms of medical intervention (gastric reduction). If you stick to self-
tracking and do not deceive yourself, the argument goes, you will achieve a 
lot with small changes in your lifestyle, even without a rigid nutritional plan 
that exceeds the will of many.  
Indeed, self-tracking apps are flexible technologies. We understand them 
as intermediate objects, i.e., objects that connect separate situations of coor-
dination, thereby “supporting the spatiotemporal scope and coherence of the 
coordination” (Diaz-Bone 2019, 81; our translation). Intermediaries mediate 
between different assessment logics. We think of this not only as a mediation 
in situations of justification, but also as a mediation underneath orders of jus-
tification. When the strength athletes distance themselves from rigid nutri-
tion plans and instead emphasize that self-tracking allows them to pursue 
their plan while maintaining flexibility to follow familiar or spontaneous eve-
ryday occurrences, it shows how these technologies can mediate between 
their commitment to the plan and their desire not to subordinate everything 
else to this plan, but to leave space for simplicity and spontaneity. At the same 
time, they could be classified as those kinds of empowered actors, who 
achieve their future goals with the help of technology and the standards inte-
grated into it. In the area of health in particular, institutional requirements 
for empowering patients overlap with ambitions for self-empowerment of us-
ers of corresponding apps and in this sense, collective logic of coordination 
overlaps with individual logic of coordination. In the quest to be healthy, pub-
lic demands for taking responsibility for one’s own health mingle with indi-
vidual efforts to pursue goals as well as with everyday life, in which familiar-
ity plays a major role. Our interpretation emphasizes in what ways 
technologies are intermediaries in this process, which on the one hand carry 
registered logics and standards into the actors’ everyday life, while on the 
other hand they support these actors in their various engagements. However, 
these logics must be situated. This in turn depends on the capabilities of the 
actors and their willingness to integrate the technologies into their everyday 
lives. This became clear, for example, with Barbara, who justified her track-
ing with a healthy lifestyle. For her, tracking was a measure to monitor a 
change in diet, which should help her to improve her health and energy. But, 
in her opinion, the app required such high precision of measurement, which 
clashed strongly with what she found to be pleasant and actionable, that she 
finally even stopped tracking entirely. The technology would have meant a 
great performative adaptation of her everyday habits and what she perceived 
as a pleasant everyday routine. The strength athletes, in contrast, resigned 
themselves to not doing their tracking as precisely as possible. In a trial and 
error process, they found out for themselves how much precision was re-
quired to at least move in the general direction of their goals. For each 
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measurement process, the strength athletes were able to give evaluative ar-
guments about how much precision is necessary or why it is just enough not 
to be as precise here or there and when to be satisfied with an estimate, for 
example, because everything else would be too complex and too annoying. 
In the end, what was most important was not that it worked perfectly well, 
but that it worked “well enough.” For many self-trackers, engagement in fa-
miliarity was a legitimate reason to limit their tracking efforts. In this case, 
the focus is on engaging in familiarity (living everyday life with ease). But we 
also find exploration in self-tracking (try it out playfully) and justification in 
public (strength athletes talk to/argue with others to show them the right way; 
Kappler et al. 2018). Consequently, self-trackers regularly deal with conflict-
ing moral demands, like self-evident concerns for one’s own health, various 
demands for performance, industrial logics of efficiency, accuracy, and plan-
ning as well as the negotiation with the various demands of everyday life. 
As a community of practice, self-trackers shift the common ways of dealing 
with themselves and thus to make themselves accessible to others. Since “dif-
ferent objects […] support distinct modes of coordination” (Thévenot 2002, 
60), it can be expected that techniques of self-tracking enable specific and 
new forms of coordination with oneself and others. Numbers and calcula-
tions as a means of observing oneself allow different approaches to oneself 
and others than it is the case with narrations (Noji and Vormbusch 2018). This 
brings us to the dual view suggested by Thévenot (2014). As intermediate ob-
jects, self-tracking technologies draw the users’ attention to certain facts – 
while hiding others. Intermediate objects unfold their own representative 
formats, their own language of how to think and communicate about bodies, 
feelings, intentions et cetera, in other words: how to relate to oneself. They 
enable people to coordinate in specific ways. As Sophie indicated in the intro-
ductory quote, it makes a difference whether you know the feeling for hunger 
or whether you can grasp hunger in quantitative form, for example 500 calo-
ries or 750 calories, because Sophie obviously learned how 500 calories hun-
ger feels like. The taxonomies of self-measurement define what is considered 
a relevant difference. And simultaneously they manifest coordinating powers 
with all their potential empowering or suppressing effects. From the perspec-
tive of governing, self-tracking as an emerging form of measuring the self 
might well be interpreted as a kind of “writing the body” (Vormbusch 2020).  
This new form of writing value is not just falling from the sky. Rather it ma-
terializes the historic ambitions to measure and “write” the world in new 
ways. In this context, it might be productive to recall that the social form of 
writing value has undergone fundamental transformations since the begin-
ning of the 12th century (cf. Hoskin and Macve 1986). It began with innova-
tions in the field of spatial structuring of texts. These were increasingly struc-
tured by the subdivision into chapters and sections, by chapter headings and 
accentuations as well as by the establishment of appendices, tables of 
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contents, and indexes. As a result, the social flexibility in the interpretation 
of these texts was shrinking (cf. Vormbusch 2012, 110). Particularly in econ-
omy and finance, double-entry bookkeeping represents the climax of this de-
velopment, which is regulated to a high degree by legal norms. One could ar-
gue that the representation of emotions, bodily sensations, and everyday 
doing in the field of self-tracking can be understood analogously as a practice 
of representation “in the making.” In contrast to long established conventions 
of writing economic value, the representation of mood, for example, is cur-
rently still highly experimental in terms of knowledge object, cognitive inter-
est, metrics, and institutionalization; self-trackers often “assemble” corre-
sponding representations from different sign systems. It is literally 
experimented in small social groups with new “spellings” of happiness. Con-
sequently, on the level of an analysis of contemporary societies, self-tracking 
can be described as an emerging practice in which actors are reacting to fun-
damental, economic and cultural uncertainties (Vormbusch 2016). Against 
the background of a growing incertitude, they are trying to reach an agree-
ment on the norms and criteria by which they themselves and their life prac-
tices could be collectively judged and altered. 
Our analysis demonstrates how people are making up this instrumentation 
in order to cope with a growing social incertitude. What is innovative about 
self-quantification is how new forms of coordinating dispersed action are 
brought into being: still gravitating towards established notions of selfhood, 
individualism, authenticity, and optimization, but simultaneously transform-
ing these notions by doing a form of quantified identity politics. It is not only 
that technology and calculation is inscribed into how self-quantifiers deal 
with themselves and the world. Since selfhood is dependent on how it is ad-
dressed and “written,” we would argue that self-quantifiers are rescribing the 
meaning of identity, selfhood, and health by transforming meaning into nu-
meric values – which is not to replace it, but rather to mingle these two in 
innovative ways. In this context, we must take the freedom into account peo-
ple have when responding to action problems of today’s modern societies by 
choosing specific ways of coordinating their actions. In this sense, they are 
not just executing a clear-cut program or unconsciously reproducing a spe-
cific discourse. What they are doing is answering specific calls (the call for 
freedom, the call for optimization, or, important in our context here, the call 
to treat themselves in a healthy and sustainable way) by drawing on conven-
tions and – particularly – their engagements with the world.  
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